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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the margin, price, and quantity decisions made by one manufacturer
and two retailers in a two-echelon supply chain under Cournot competition. The manufacturer
produces two types of substitutable products and sells one product to each retailer. The retail-
ers carry one type of product, which is sold to the customer. The objective of this paper is to
show existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium for decisions made by one manufacturer
and two retailers and to study the implications of these decisions through sensitivity analysis.
This paper makes contributions to the literature in three ways. First, it extends on the lit-
erature by modeling an oligopoly of one manufacturer and two retailers selling differentiated
products and acting in Cournot competition. Second, this paper demonstrates the sufficient
conditions for existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in a two-echelon supply chain
with linear and nonlinear demand. Third, this paper has three main findings: (1) the retailer
with the lower price effect or lower price elasticity of demand has a higher margin, price, quan-
tity demanded, and profit; (2) all players in the supply chain prefer to sell products with a
high cross price effect or high cross price elasticity of demand; and (3) the manufacturer will
always earn the most profit among the three members of the supply chain.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the margin, price, and quantity decisions made by an oligopoly under
Cournot competition. The oligopoly, which was also modeled by Yang & Zhou (2006), is a
supply chain that consists of one manufacturer and two retailers and is represented in Figure
1.1. The manufacturer produces two types of products, and one type of product is sold to each
retailer for the same wholesale price. The products sold to the customers are substitutable. For
example, suppose a food manufacturer produces cheese and sells the cheese to competing gro-
cery store retailers for the same wholesale price. The two grocery stores then sell the cheese to
customers under different brand names. This example is noteworthy because numerous grocery
stores sell their own store brand products. The preceding example will be used throughout this
paper to appreciate the linear and nonlinear demand models. An additional example pertains
to a supply chain for sports equipment. Suppose a sports equipment manufacturer produces
two different brands of tennis balls. The manufacturer sells one brand of tennis ball to one
retailer and the other brand of tennis ball to the other retailer. The wholesale price is the same
for both tennis balls. These are just two of a wide variety of examples that are appropriate
for the supply chain model presented in this paper. In addition to differences in the products
themselves, products can be differentiated by the location from which the product is sold, the
speed of delivery, and the service provided [Friedman (1983)].
This paper explores two demand curves. The linear demand curve follows that of Singh &
Vives (1984) and Varian (1992). The nonlinear demand curve is modeled after Shugan (1989)
and Choi (1991). This paper utilizes the sufficient conditions stated in Friedman (1977) and
Friedman (1983) to show existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. Existence and
uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium is explicitly shown for the linear demand model. As for the
2Figure 1.1 Oligopoly: One Manufacturer, Two Retailers
nonlinear demand model, existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium is verified through
computational efforts. Furthermore, the effects of initial demand, price effect, manufacturing
variable cost, and cross price effect for a linear demand model and market potential, price
elasticity of demand, manufacturing variable cost, and cross price elasticity of demand for
a nonlinear demand model are investigated through sensitivity analysis. Conclusions of the
analysis help the manufacturer and retailers determine which products to produce or sell.
Game theory and supply chain models have been combined in previous marketing and
economic literature. Jeuland & Shugan (1983) studied the coordination issues that arise in
a vertical supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. McGuire & Staelin
(1983) analyzed the consequences of vertical integration versus decentralization in a supply
chain with two manufacturers and one retailer. Choi (1991) studied the equilibrium prices
and profits of two manufacturers and one retailer acting under three different competitive
behaviors: manufacturer-Stackelberg, retailer-Stackelberg, and Cournot. In addition, Yang &
Zhou (2006) analyzed the optimal prices and profits of one manufacturer and two retailers
playing in Cournot, collusion, and Stackelberg games.
Several supply chain models have examined differentiated products, an assumption which
greatly influences the results of the model. McGuire & Staelin (1983) considered the effect
of product substitutability in a duopoly of manufacturers that sell goods to a single retailer.
The paper showed that if the manufacturers’ products are highly substitutable in demand,
decentralization is a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, if the products have low substitutability,
each manufacturer will attain vertical integration. Moorthy (1988) extended on the research
3of McGuire & Staelin (1983) to identify the conditions under which decentralization is a Nash
equilibrium. Under a linear demand curve, Choi (1991) showed that both wholesale and retail
prices increase with product substitutability. In contrast, under a nonlinear demand curve,
the opposite was true. As products became more substitutable, wholesale and retail prices
decreased. Yang & Zhou (2006) studied the degree of substitutability between duopolistic
retailers and showed that as substitutability increases, or the stronger the retailers compete,
the higher the wholesale and retail prices.
A supply chain with a linear demand curve is the first to be presented in this paper.
Among the papers to study linear demand and the supply chain include McGuire & Staelin
(1983), Moorthy (1988), Choi (1991), and Yang & Zhou (2006). Linear demand curves set
the foundation for research pertaining to other demand functions. The second demand model
studied in this paper is a constant elasticity nonlinear demand function. The constant elasticity
nonlinear demand function has many applications in theoretical and empirical research, and
Shugan (1989) expands on its importance. Shugan used this particular demand function
to explore the significance of product assortment by producers of economical, regular, and
premium products. Choi (1991) also utilized a constant elasticity nonlinear demand function,
which built on the findings of Choi’s linear demand model.
The choice of demand curve is very important when modeling supply chains. Lau &
Lau (2003) examined the effect several different demand curves have on decisions made in
one-echelon, two-echelon, and three-echelon structures. The paper showed that equilibrium
solutions in multi-echelon models change considerably over a small change in the demand
curve. Consequently, economic differences between manufacturer and retailer profits result.
Lau & Lau (2005) extended on Lau & Lau (2003) to show that results obtained with the
assumption of a specific demand curve cannot be generalized to situations where other demand
curves apply.
Existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium for each model in this paper is presented.
As described in Cachon & Netessine (2004), existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is very
important in game theory. With existence of equilibrium, a solution to the game can be
4found. Once existence of equilibrium is established, uniqueness of equilibrium may or may not
be achieved. A game with a unique equilibrium is significant because only one outcome will
occur. Players can then have confidence that their decision will produce an equilibrium and
the outcome that they expect.
The method used to determine existence of Cournot equilibrium in this paper reflects
that of Friedman (1977) and Friedman (1983). In addition to several assumptions, the
sufficient conditions for existence are: (1) the players’ reaction functions intersect, (2) all
players’ assumptions are true, and (3) the second order sufficient condition (SOSC) is met.
Friedman (1977) and Friedman (1983), in addition to Cachon & Netessine (2004) and Gallego,
Huh, Kang, & Phillips (2006), use the contraction mapping approach to show uniqueness of
equilibrium.
This paper makes contributions to the literature in three ways. First, it extends on the
literature by modeling an oligopoly of one manufacturer and two retailers selling differentiated
products and acting in Cournot competition. Second, unlike previous literature such as Choi
(1991) and Yang & Zhou (2006), this paper demonstrates the sufficient conditions for existence
and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in a two-echelon supply chain with linear and nonlinear
demand. Third, this paper has three main findings: (1) the retailer with the lower price effect
or lower price elasticity of demand has a higher margin, price, quantity demanded, and profit;
(2) all players in the supply chain prefer to sell products with a high cross price effect or high
cross price elasticity of demand; and (3) the manufacturer will always earn the most profit
among the three members of the supply chain.
This paper is organized as follows. The next chapter develops the Cournot model with lin-
ear demand. The sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium is
presented. Chapter 3 summarizes the results of the linear demand model. Sensitivity analysis
is performed to discuss the implications of initial demand, price effect, manufacturing variable
cost, and product differentiation. Chapter 4 derives an alternative to the linear demand model
by means of a nonlinear demand function. The sufficient conditions for existence and unique-
ness of Cournot equilibrium is shown. Chapter 5 discusses the results of the nonlinear demand
5model. It is here that absolute market potential, price elasticity of demand, manufacturing
variable cost, and cross price elasticity of demand are investigated through sensitivity analysis.
The last chapter summarizes the important findings of this paper and proposes areas of future
research.
6CHAPTER 2. COURNOT MODEL WITH LINEAR DEMAND
This section begins with the assumptions and notation used in the Cournot model with
linear demand. The derivation of the model is then performed, which includes the equilibrium
margin, price, and quantity decisions. The sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness
of Cournot equilibrium is also shown.
2.1 Model Assumptions and Notation
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and two retailers
acting in Cournot competition. The manufacturer and retailers react simultaneously by setting
their margins or prices. The corresponding order quantity is then determined. There is no
cooperation between any of the players and no player has influence over the decisions of any
other player. The objective for each player is to maximize profit. Neither the manufacturer
nor the retailers participate in the game when profits are negative.
The manufacturer produces two types of products, and one type of product is sold to each
retailer for the same wholesale price. In addition, wholesale and retail prices are assumed to
be strictly positive and retailers i and j sell substitutable products. Further assumptions and
notation are explained below.
mi: retail margin per unit for retailer i, i=1,2;
mˆ: manufacturer margin per unit;
pi: price per unit charged to the customers by retailer i, i=1,2;
w: wholesale price per unit charged to the retailers by the manufacturer;
c: manufacturing variable cost per unit;
ΠRi : retailer i ’s profit, i=1,2;
7ΠM : manufacturer’s profit;
ΠC : total channel profit;
RT : ratio of the manufacturer’s profit to the total profit of the retailers.
The downward sloping linear demand function that captures product substitutability is
given by
qi = ai − bipi + γpj , i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. (2.1)
Since pi = mi + w, (2.1) becomes
qi = ai − bi(mi + w) + γ(mj + w), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, (2.2)
where
qi: customer demand, in units, faced by retailer i or the quantity ordered, in units, from the
manufacturer by retailer i, i=1,2;
ai: initial demand, retailer i, i=1,2;
bi: price effect, retailer i, i=1,2;
γ: cross price effect.
Price effect is the measure of sensitivity of retailer i ’s sales to changes in retailer i ’s price.
When price effect is high, changes in retailer i ’s price will significantly change the quantity
demanded for retailer i. Similarly, when price effect is low, changes in retailer i ’s price will
have little influence on the quantity demanded for retailer i. As seen in Varian (1992), cross
price effects are symmetric, which is required for a well-behaved consumer demand function.
Symmetric cross price effects is an important condition for a representative consumer to exist
[Anderson, de Palma, & Thisse (1992)]. When cross price effect is high, changes in retailer i ’s
price will significantly change the quantity demanded for retailer j. Likewise, when cross price
effect is low, changes in retailer i ’s price will have minor influence on the quantity demanded
for retailer j.
8The parameters in (2.1) and (2.2) are assumed to satisfy ai > 0 and bi > γ > 0 [Choi
(1991)]. ai > 0 because demand is positive when pi = 0. bi > γ since retailer i ’s own price
effect has a greater influence on the quantity demanded for retailer i than the cross price
effect. γ > 0 to signify that the products are substitutes. γ < 0 represents products that
are complements, and when γ = 0, products are independent or completely differentiated
from one another. When ai = aj , γ
2
bibj
defines the index of product differentiation. As this
index approaches zero, the products become more differentiated. If γ
2
bibj
= 0, the products
are independent of one another. As this index approaches one, the products become more
substitutable. When γ
2
bibj
= 1, the products are perfect substitutes; there is a homogeneous
market [Singh & Vives (1984)].
2.2 Model Derivation
The manufacturer’s profit is given by
ΠM = (w − c)(qi + qj), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, (2.3)
and each retailer’s profit is
ΠRi = miqi, i = 1, 2. (2.4)
The manufacturer maximizes its profit and determines its wholesale price based on the retail
margin of both retailers; the manufacturer takes the retail margins as given. The variables
taken as given are identified by a bar in subsequent equations. The objective function for the
manufacturer using (2.2) and (2.3) is
max
w
ΠM = (w − c)[a1 − b1(m¯1 + w) + γ(m¯2 + w) + a2 − b2(m¯2 + w) + γ(m¯1 + w)].
(2.5)
Each retailer maximizes its profit and decides upon its retail margin based on the wholesale
price of the manufacturer and retail price of the competing retailer. To put it differently, retailer
i takes the wholesale price of the manufacturer and retailer j ’s price as given. The objective
9function for each retailer using (2.2) and (2.4) is
max
m1
ΠR1 = m1[a1 − b1(m1 + w¯) + γ(m¯2 + w¯)],
max
m2
ΠR2 = m2[a2 − b2(m2 + w¯) + γ(m¯1 + w¯)]. (2.6)
The manufacturer’s reaction function is determined using the first order necessary condition
(FONC) of the manufacturer’s objective function in (2.5). The reaction function for each
retailer is found using the FONC of the retailer’s objective function in (2.6). The reaction
function represents the margin or price in which a player is maximizing profit given the margin
or price of all other players. The FONC for the manufacturer is
∂ΠM
∂w
= a1 + a2 − b1(m¯1 + 2w)− b2(m¯2 + 2w) + γ(m¯1 + m¯2 + 4w) + c(b1 + b2 − 2γ) = 0.
(2.7)
The FONC for the two retailers is
∂ΠR1
∂m1
= a1 − b1(2m1 + w¯) + γ(m¯2 + w¯) = 0,
∂ΠR2
∂m2
= a2 − b2(2m2 + w¯) + γ(m¯1 + w¯) = 0. (2.8)
Solving (2.7) and (2.8) simultaneously using three equations and three unknown decision
variables becomes
w∗ =
2b1b2(a1 + a2 + 2b1c+ 2b2c− 4cγ) + cγ2(2γ − b1 − b2) + γ(a1b2 + a2b1)
2(b1 + b2)(3b1b2 − γ2)− 2γ(5b1b2 − γ2) ,
m1
∗ =
a2(γ − b2)(2γ − b1) + 2b1b2c(b1 + b2)− a1b2(2b1 + 3b2) + 5b2γ(a1 − b1c) + cγ(b2 + γ)(2γ − b2)− b1cγ2
2γ(5b1b2 − γ2)− 2(b1 + b2)(3b1b2 − γ2) ,
m2
∗ =
a1(γ − b1)(2γ − b2) + 2b1b2c(b1 + b2)− a2b1(3b1 + 2b2) + 5b1γ(a2 − b2c) + cγ(b1 + γ)(2γ − b1)− b2cγ2
2γ(5b1b2 − γ2)− 2(b1 + b2)(3b1b2 − γ2) .
(2.9)
(2.9) represents an equilibrium for the decisions made by one manufacturer and two retailers
and can be expressed by the vector
[
w∗ m1∗ m2∗
]
. The Cournot equilibrium price vector
can then be described as
[
w∗ m1∗ + w∗ m2∗ + w∗
]
=
[
w∗ p1∗ p2∗
]
. These are the
price decisions that attain maximum profit for the manufacturer and retailers. No entity in
the oligopoly can increase its profit by choosing a price different from this price vector, and
10
price equilibrium is achieved. Further explanation on the sufficient conditions for existence
and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium appears in Section 2.3.
The equilibrium price and quantity is simplified when all parameters for retailer 1 and
retailer 2 are equal: a1 = a2 = a and b1 = b2 = b. Using (2.9), equilibrium wholesale price and
retail margins are
w∗ =
ab+ c(2b− γ)(b− γ)
3b2 − 4bγ + γ2 ,
m1
∗ =
a− c(b− γ)
3b− γ ,
m2
∗ =
a− c(b− γ)
3b− γ , (2.10)
and using (2.2) and (2.10), equilibrium quantities are
q1
∗ =
b[a− c(b− γ)]
3b− γ ,
q2
∗ =
b[a− c(b− γ)]
3b− γ . (2.11)
(2.10) and (2.11) show that retail margins and quantities are identical when a1 = a2 = a
and b1 = b2 = b. In addition, q1 = bm1 and q2 = bm2 when a1 = a2 = a and b1 = b2 = b.
Using (2.3), (2.4), (2.10), and (2.11), the profit equations become
Π∗M =
2b2[a− c(b− γ)]2
(3b− γ)(3b2 − 4bγ + γ2) ,
Π∗R1 =
b[a− c(b− γ)]2
(3b− γ)2 ,
Π∗R2 =
b[a− c(b− γ)]2
(3b− γ)2 . (2.12)
(2.12) shows that retailers have identical profits when a1 = a2 = a and b1 = b2 = b. Also from
(2.12), RT = bb−γ . So, the manufacturer will always earn more profit than the combined profit
of the two retailers when a1 = a2 = a and b1 = b2 = b since a > 0 and b > γ > 0.
2.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium
2.3.1 Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
In order to show existence of Cournot equilibrium, several assumptions are made for the
demand and cost functions. The conditions listed below are taken from Friedman (1977).
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Assumption 1 : ∀p ≥ 0, demand is defined, continuous, bounded, and nonnegative.
Assumption 2 : ∀p > 0, the demand function is twice continuously differentiable.
Assumption 3 : Cost is defined and continuous for nonnegative demand. When demand
equals zero, cost is greater than or equal to zero.
Assumption 4 : The cost function is twice continuously differentiable for demand greater
than zero.
In addition to these four assumptions, three conditions are sufficient for the existence of
Cournot equilibrium and are found in Friedman (1977) and Friedman (1983). The three
conditions are as follows: (1) the players’ reaction functions intersect; (2) all players’ assump-
tions regarding other players’ actions turn out to be true; and (3) the second order sufficient
condition (SOSC) is met. The SOSC ensures that the equilibrium is one that maximizes profit.
Each condition for the existence of Cournot equilibrium will be shown as it relates to the linear
demand model. Refer to Appendix A for an additional example illustrating the three sufficient
conditions for existence of Cournot equilibrium.
2.3.1.1 Intersection of Players’ Reaction Functions
The first sufficient condition to be presented for the existence of Cournot equilibrium is the
intersection of the three players’ reaction functions. The reaction functions for the manufac-
turer and retailers are found by solving (2.7) and (2.8) individually for each decision variable.
The three reaction functions are
w(m¯1, m¯2) =
a1 + a2 − m¯1(b1 − γ)− m¯2(b2 − γ) + c(b1 + b2 − 2γ)
2(b1 + b2 − 2γ) ,
m1(w¯, m¯2) =
a1 − b1w¯ + γ(m¯2 + w¯)
2b1
,
m2(w¯, m¯1) =
a2 − b2w¯ + γ(m¯1 + w¯)
2b2
. (2.13)
(2.9) is the intersection of the three reaction functions in (2.13).
12
2.3.1.2 Players’ Assumptions are True
The previous section displayed the reaction functions of each firm, given each firm’s beliefs
about the other firms’ actions. For Cournot equilibrium to exist, the assumptions each firm
makes about another firm’s actions must be the actual behavior. This can be described sym-
bolically as w¯ = w∗, m¯1 = m1∗, and m¯2 = m2∗. If each firm actually knew the true reactions
of every other firm, no firm would have incentive to deviate from its decision.
2.3.1.3 Second Order Sufficient Condition
The second order sufficient condition (SOSC) is the remaining sufficient condition for the
existence of Cournot equilibrium. When the profit functions of the oligopoly members are
concave at equilibrium, the SOSC is satisfied. According to Cachon & Netessine (2004),
a concave profit function implies a unique reaction function but does not imply a unique
equilibrium. Refer to Appendix A for an example that includes concave profit functions and
multiple equilibria.
(2.14) shows that the SOSC is satisfied for the linear demand model. Each firm maximizes
its profit since b1 > γ > 0 and b2 > γ > 0
∂2ΠM
∂w2
= 4γ − 2(b1 + b2) < 0,
∂2ΠR1
∂m21
= −2b1 < 0,
∂2ΠR2
∂m22
= −2b2 < 0. (2.14)
2.3.2 Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium
Uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium will be shown using the method presented in Friedman
(1977), Friedman (1983), Cachon & Netessine (2004), and Gallego, Huh, Kang, & Phillips
(2006). Each paper uses the contraction mapping argument to demonstrate uniqueness of
equilibrium. In particular, Friedman (1983) uses this argument to show uniqueness of Cournot
equilibrium with differentiated products. An example of a game with multiple equilibria is
13
presented in Appendix A. Since the game has multiple equilibria, the contraction mapping
argument fails, and this is shown in Appendix B.
In order for the contraction mapping argument to be satisfied, the reaction function of
each firm has to be shown to be a contraction. Using the reaction functions from (2.13), the
condition for uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium using the contraction mapping approach is
∣∣∣∣∂w(m¯1, m¯2)∂m¯1
∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∂w(m¯1, m¯2)∂m¯2
∣∣∣∣ < 1,∣∣∣∣∂m1(w¯, m¯2)∂w¯
∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∂m1(w¯, m¯2)∂m¯2
∣∣∣∣ < 1,∣∣∣∣∂m2(w¯, m¯1)∂w¯
∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∂m2(w¯, m¯1)∂m¯1
∣∣∣∣ < 1. (2.15)
This becomes
1
2
∣∣∣∣ b1 − γb1 + b2 − 2γ
∣∣∣∣+ 12
∣∣∣∣ b2 − γb1 + b2 − 2γ
∣∣∣∣ < 1,∣∣∣∣γ − b12b1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ γ2b1
∣∣∣∣ < 1,∣∣∣∣γ − b22b2
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ γ2b2
∣∣∣∣ < 1. (2.16)
Each reaction function is a contraction since b1 > γ > 0 and b2 > γ > 0. Thus, uniqueness
of Cournot equilibrium has been shown. There is only vector, namely
[
w∗ m1∗ m2∗
]
from
(2.9), that satisfies the three reaction functions in (2.13).
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CHAPTER 3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LINEAR DEMAND
This chapter summarizes the results of the linear demand model. Sensitivity analysis
was performed to determine the effects that four parameters had on equilibrium margins,
prices, quantities, and profits. The parameters, which include initial demand, price effect,
manufacturing variable cost, and cross price effect, lead the discussion for the analysis of the
linear demand model. Observations related to the sensitivity analysis will be expressed, in
addition to the economic and managerial implications for the manufacturer, retailers, and
consumers.
The basic parameter values are a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, c = 10, and γ = 2.0.
When the parameters c and γ were investigated, the parameters were allowed to vary between
the respective upper and lower feasible limits: w > c > 0, b1 > γ > 0, and b2 > γ > 0.
Additional parameters were allowed to differ by ±10%, ±20%, and ±50%, as seen in Arcelus
& Srinivasan (1989). Using these parameter values and equations (2.2), (2.5), (2.6), and (2.9),
the equilibrium quantities, profits, margins, and prices were computed.
The examples used for the sensitivity analysis are shown in Appendix C. Equilibrium deci-
sions for the two-echelon model, total channel profit, and RT , the ratio of the manufacturer’s
profit to the total profit of the retailers, will be addressed in the following sections.
3.1 Initial Demand
The results of the sensitivity analysis for initial demand is shown in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3,
and 3.4. The initial demand for retailer 1 was varied while all other parameters were held
constant. The conclusions relating to retailer 1 are identical to the conclusions that would be
made for retailer 2, had the initial demand for retailer 2 been altered instead of retailer 1.
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Figure 3.1 a1: a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, c = 10, γ = 2.0
As the initial demand for retailer 1 increases, margin for retailer 1 also increases, which
leads to an increase in total profit for retailer 1. When initial demand is small, retail margin is
low, but when initial demand is large, retail margin is high. The same is true for retail price.
Retailer 1 sells its product at a low price when the initial demand for the product is small and
at a high price when initial demand is large. Retailer 2 has decreasing retail margin, increasing
retail price, and decreasing quantity demanded as the initial demand for retailer 1 increases.
This set of conditions results in decreasing profit for retailer 2.
The manufacturer margin, wholesale price, and manufacturer profit increase with initial
demand. Also, the manufacturer earns the largest profit among all members of the supply
chain regardless of the initial demand for retailer 1.
Figure 3.3 shows that demand for retailer 1 increases with initial demand while the demand
for retailer 2 slightly decreases. As displayed in Appendix C, the smaller the difference between
initial demand for retailer 1 and initial demand for retailer 2, the higher RT becomes. RT is
highest when the retailers have identical initial demands. In addition, total profit of the supply
chain increases as initial demand for retailer 1 increases.
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Figure 3.2 a1: a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, c = 10, γ = 2.0
Figure 3.3 a1: a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, c = 10, γ = 2.0
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Figure 3.4 a1: a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, c = 10, γ = 2.0
The manufacturer prefers initial demand to be as large as possible since this is when the
manufacturer earns the largest profit. The retailer with the larger initial demand has a higher
retail margin, higher retail price, larger quantity demanded, and larger profit, ceteris paribus.
Thus, large initial demand is beneficial to the entire supply chain. Using the cheese example
from Chapter 1, if customers have a large initial demand for cheese, grocery store retailers
will benefit from high sales. Additionally, the manufacturer will benefit by producing a large
quantity of cheese for the grocery stores. From the point of view of the consumer, surplus is
largest when initial demand is smallest. Consumers face a low retail price that is similar to
wholesale price when initial demand is small.
3.2 Price Effect
Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 display the sensitivity analysis in regards to price effect. Price
effect for retailer 1 was allowed to vary while all other parameters were held constant. Had
price effect for retailer 2 been analyzed, the conclusions for the two retailers would be reversed.
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Figure 3.5 b1: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b2 = 5.0, c = 10, γ = 2.0
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that as price effect for retailer 1 increases, both retail margin and
retail price for retailer 1 decrease. When price effect is low, retail margin is high. When price
effect is high, retail margin is low. Retail margin for retailer 2 slightly increases as price effect
for retailer 1 increases. Retail price for retailer 2 and wholesale price for the manufacturer both
decrease but decrease at a slower rate than the retail price for retailer 1. The manufacturer
margin also decreases as price effect increases.
As price effect for retailer 1 increases in Figure 3.7, quantity demanded decreases for retailer
1 and increases for retailer 2. Price effect also influences the profits of the supply chain, as
can be seen in Figure 3.8. When price effect for retailer 1 is low, retailer 1 has a large profit.
When price effect for retailer 1 is high, retailer 1 has a small profit while retailer 2 has a
profit comparable to the manufacturer. The manufacturer has the largest profit among the
members of the oligopoly regardless of the price effect for retailer 1. The profits for retailer
1 and the manufacturer decrease as price effect for retailer 1 increases. Conversely, retailer 2
has increasing profits with increasing price effect for retailer 1.
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Figure 3.6 b1: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b2 = 5.0, c = 10, γ = 2.0
Figure 3.7 b1: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b2 = 5.0, c = 10, γ = 2.0
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Figure 3.8 b1: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b2 = 5.0, c = 10, γ = 2.0
Further analysis is done using the examples in Appendix C. As the difference between the
price effect for the retailers increases, RT generally decreases. Furthermore, total supply chain
profit decreases as price effect increases.
RT is highest when the difference between the price effects for the retailers is small but not
equal. The manufacturer achieves its largest profit when price effect is lowest. Based on these
two observations, the manufacturer would benefit when price effect for the retailers is similar
and as low as possible. The retailer with the lower price effect will have a higher retail margin,
higher retail price, larger quantity demanded, and larger profit in relation to the other retailer.
A retailer will benefit the most when its price effect is low and the difference between its own
price effect and price effect for the other retailer is large. So, in regards to the latter, the
manufacturer and retailers have conflicting objectives. Consumers benefit when price effect is
high because they pay for a low retail price similar to that of the wholesale price. However,
when price effect is low, consumers incur high retail prices.
21
Each member in the oligopoly benefits when price effect for the retailers is low. So, if the
price effect for a product, such as cheese, is low, grocery store retailers would prefer to sell this
product. However, if the price effect for a product is high, grocery store retailers may abandon
the product and, in its place, sell a product with a lower price effect. The same idea applies
to the manufacturer. If empirical studies have shown that the price effect for a product the
manufacturer produces is high, the manufacturer may consider producing a product with a
lower price effect.
3.3 Manufacturing Variable Cost
This section investigates the implications behind manufacturing variable cost. Only the
values leading to a positive profit were examined (w > c > 0). Figures 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, and
3.12, along with the examples in Appendix C, help direct the discussion for this section.
Figure 3.9 c: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, γ = 2.0
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Figure 3.10 c: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, γ = 2.0
Figure 3.11 c: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, γ = 2.0
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Figure 3.12 c: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, γ = 2.0
Margins decrease and prices increase as manufacturing variable cost increases. Retail mar-
gins and prices are identical for both retailers regardless of manufacturing variable cost since
a1 = a2 and b1 = b2; refer to equation (2.10). An increase in manufacturing variable cost leads
to a smaller increase in wholesale price and an even smaller increase in retail price.
Quantity demanded decreases as manufacturing variable cost increases and is identical for
both retailers since a1 = a2 and b1 = b2; refer to equation (2.11). Quantity demanded is large
when manufacturing variable cost is small and is small when manufacturing variable cost is
large.
The combination of decreasing manufacturer and retail margins and decreasing demand
results in decreasing profits. Conversely, the manufacturer and retailers have large profits
when manufacturing variable cost is low. Manufacturing variable cost does not alter RT since
initial demand and price effects are symmetric; refer to equation (2.12).
The oligopoly and consumers alike benefit from low manufacturing variable cost. The
cheese example from Chapter 1 is used to demonstrate this concept. If the manufacturing
variable cost for cheese is low, the manufacturer can produce cheese at a low cost; this benefits
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the manufacturer. The manufacturer is then able to sell cheese to the grocery store retailers at
a low wholesale price; this benefits the grocery stores. Finally, due to the low wholesale price,
grocery stores are able to sell cheese to the consumers at a low retail price; this benefits the
consumers.
3.4 Cross Price Effect
The final parameter to be analyzed for the linear demand model is cross price effect. Cross
price effect has been varied between the upper and lower limits for this analysis, b1 > γ > 0 and
b2 > γ > 0, while all other parameters were held constant. Referring back to Chapter 2, γ
2
b1b2
defines the index of product differentiation when a1 = a2. Since cross price effect is the only
parameter allowed to change in this analysis, an increase in cross price effect is equivalent to
stating that products are more substitutable or less differentiated. Likewise, a decrease in cross
price effect is equivalent to stating that products are less substitutable or more differentiated.
Figure 3.13 γ: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, c = 10
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Figure 3.14 γ: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, c = 10
Figure 3.15 γ: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, c = 10
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Figure 3.16 γ: a1 = 100, a2 = 100, b1 = 5.0, b2 = 5.0, c = 10
As cross price effect increases, margins, prices, quantity demanded, and profits of all supply
chain players increase. Retailers have identical margins, prices, quantity demanded, and profits
regardless of cross price effect since a1 = a2 and b1 = b2. Equations (2.10), (2.11), and (2.12)
support these observations. Furthermore, margins, prices, quantity demanded, and profits
are highest when goods are close substitutes ( γ
2
b1b2
→ 1). The opposite is true when goods are
highly differentiated ( γ
2
b1b2
→ 0). RT increases as cross price effect increases and is highest when
products are close substitutes. Figures 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16, along with the examples in
Appendix C, reflect the previous observations.
When products are close substitutes, the manufacturer has a large profit due to high man-
ufacturer margin and large demand. Wholesale price increases as cross price effect increases
even though manufacturing variable cost stays constant. Similarly, retailers have high mar-
gins, high prices, large demand, and large profits when cross price effect is high. Since the
objective for the manufacturer and retailers is to maximize profit, the manufacturer benefits
from producing products that have a high cross price effect, and retailers benefit from selling
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products that have a high cross price effect. Furthermore, each retailer may consider selling
several substitutable products, such as multiple brands of cheese, to earn more profit.
Consumers benefit in two ways from a low cross price effect. First, retail prices are low.
Second, consumers can buy differentiated products. Conversely, consumers endure high retail
prices and have a limited product selection when cross price effect is high.
The sensitivity analysis for cross price effect has brought about a weakness in the linear
demand model. As products become more substitutable, prices increase. This is contrary to
intuition, but similar conclusions were made by Choi (1991) and Yang & Zhou (2006). Other
papers, such as Choi (1996), have found a way around this weakness of the linear demand
model, but improbable assumptions were made.
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CHAPTER 4. COURNOT MODEL WITH NONLINEAR DEMAND
This chapter follows a similar outline as that of Chapter 2 but with a constant elasticity
nonlinear demand function. Derivation is carried out, which is then followed by the sufficient
conditions for existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium.
4.1 Model Assumptions and Notation
The manufacturer produces two types of products, and one type of product is sold to each
retailer for the same wholesale price. The objective for the manufacturer and each retailer is
to maximize profit, and no player operates when profits are negative. In addition, wholesale
and retail prices are assumed to be strictly positive, and retailers i and j sell substitutable
products. Further assumptions and notation are given below.
mi: retail margin per unit for retailer i, i=1,2;
mˆ: manufacturer margin per unit;
pi: price per unit charged to the customers by retailer i, i=1,2;
w: wholesale price per unit charged to the retailers by the manufacturer;
c: manufacturing variable cost per unit;
ΠRi : retailer i ’s profit, i=1,2;
ΠM : manufacturer’s profit;
ΠC : total channel profit;
RT : ratio of the manufacturer’s profit to the total profit of the retailers.
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The downward sloping constant elasticity nonlinear demand function that captures differ-
entiated products is given by
qi = αi(pi)−βi(pj)δi , i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. (4.1)
Since pi = mi + w, (4.1) becomes
qi = αi(mi + w)−βi(mj + w)δi , i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, (4.2)
where
qi: customer demand, in units, faced by retailer i or the quantity ordered, in units, from the
manufacturer by retailer i, i=1,2;
αi: a measure of retailer i ’s absolute market potential, i=1,2;
βi: price elasticity of demand, retailer i, i=1,2;
δi: cross price elasticity of demand, retailer i, i=1,2.
The price elasticity of demand is a constant value equal to that of βi. If βi is high, the
quantity demanded for retailer i significantly changes as the price for retailer i changes. If βi
is low, the quantity demanded for retailer i stays relatively the same as the price for retailer
i changes. The cross price elasticity of demand is a constant value equal to that of δi . If δi
is high, the quantity demanded for retailer i drastically changes when the price for retailer j
changes. If δi is low, the quantity demanded for retailer i stays relatively the same when the
price for retailer j changes.
The parameters in (4.1) and (4.2) are assumed to satisfy αi > 0, βi > 2 , and 1 > δi > 0.
αi > 0 because market potential is positive. For equilibrium to exist, βi > 2. As a result,
the price elasticity of demand will always be elastic. Finally, 1 > δi > 0 to model substitute
products. When δi < 0, products are complements.
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4.2 Model Derivation
The manufacturer’s profit is given by equation (2.3). After expanding the manufacturer’s
profit equation to include equation (4.2), the manufacturer’s objective function becomes
max
w
ΠM = (w − c)[α1(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1 + α2(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2 ].
(4.3)
The manufacturer determines its wholesale price based on each retailer’s retail margin; the
manufacturer takes the retail margins as given. The variables taken as given are identified
by a bar in equation (4.3). The same is true for subsequent equations. Each retailer bases
its retail price on the wholesale price of the manufacturer and retail price of the competing
retailer; each retailer takes these values as given.
The profit for each retailer is given by equation (2.4). The objective function for each
retailer using (2.4) and (4.2) is
max
m1
ΠR1 = m1α1(m1 + w¯)
−β1(m¯2 + w¯)δ1 ,
max
m2
ΠR2 = m2α2(m2 + w¯)
−β2(m¯1 + w¯)δ2 . (4.4)
The first order necessary condition (FONC) for the manufacturer is
∂ΠM
∂w
= α1(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1 + α2(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2
− α1β1w(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1 + α1δ1w(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1
− α2β2w(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2 + α2δ2w(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2−1
+ α1β1c(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1 − α1cδ1(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1
+ α2β2c(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2 − α2cδ2(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2−1 = 0.
(4.5)
The FONC for the two retailers is
∂ΠR1
∂m1
= α1(m¯2 + w¯)δ1 [(m1 + w¯)−β1 − β1m1(m1 + w¯)−β1−1] = 0,
∂ΠR2
∂m2
= α2(m¯1 + w¯)δ2 [(m2 + w¯)−β2 − β2m2(m2 + w¯)−β2−1] = 0. (4.6)
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Using equation (4.6), the reaction functions for the retailers take the form of
m1(w¯, m¯2) =
w
β1 − 1 ,
m2(w¯, m¯1) =
w
β2 − 1 . (4.7)
As (4.7) shows, the retail margin for retailer i is independent of the retail margin for retailer
j. Furthermore, retail margins are identical when β1 = β2 = β. The reaction function for the
manufacturer cannot be stated as an explicit function. So, it will be described by the implicit
function in (4.5).
A closed form solution for the equilibrium is possible when α1 = α2 = α, β1 = β2 = β, and
δ1 = δ2 = δ. Through the use of (4.5) and (4.7), the three unknown decision variables become
w∗ =
c(β − 1)(β − δ)
β2 − 2β − βδ + δ ,
m1
∗ =
c(β − δ)
β2 − 2β − βδ + δ ,
m2
∗ =
c(β − δ)
β2 − 2β − βδ + δ . (4.8)
(4.8) represents the equilibrium wholesale price and retail margins and is the intersection of the
reaction functions for the manufacturer and two retailers when α1 = α2 = α, β1 = β2 = β, and
δ1 = δ2 = δ. The equilibrium depends on three parameters, namely manufacturing variable
cost, price elasticity of demand, and cross price elasticity of demand. (4.8) can be expressed
by the vector
[
w∗ m1∗ m2∗
]
. The Cournot equilibrium price vector can then be described
as
[
w∗ m1∗ + w∗ m2∗ + w∗
]
=
[
w∗ p1∗ p2∗
]
. No entity in the oligopoly can increase
its profit by making a decision different from this Cournot equilibrium price vector.
Equilibrium quantities are determined using (4.2) and (4.8) and are represented by
q1
∗ = α(
βc(β − δ)
β2 − 2β − βδ + δ )
δ−β
,
q2
∗ = α(
βc(β − δ)
β2 − 2β − βδ + δ )
δ−β
. (4.9)
As (4.8) and (4.9) show, retail margins and quantity demanded are identical when α1 = α2 = α,
β1 = β2 = β, and δ1 = δ2 = δ.
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Using (2.3), (2.4), (4.8), and (4.9), the profit equations become
Π∗M =
2αβc( βc(β−δ)
β2−2β−βδ+δ )
δ−β
β2 − 2β − βδ + δ ,
Π∗R1 =
αc(β − δ)( βc(β−δ)
β2−2β−βδ+δ )
δ−β
β2 − 2β − βδ + δ ,
Π∗R2 =
αc(β − δ)( βc(β−δ)
β2−2β−βδ+δ )
δ−β
β2 − 2β − βδ + δ . (4.10)
(4.10) shows retail profits are identical when α1 = α2 = α, β1 = β2 = β, and δ1 = δ2 = δ. Also,
unlike equilibrium prices, equilibrium quantities and profits are dependent on all parameters.
Additionally, RT = ββ−δ , which is derived from (4.10). Thus, the manufacturer will always
earn more profit than the combined profit of the two retailers when α1 = α2 = α, β1 = β2 = β,
and δ1 = δ2 = δ since α > 0, β > 2, and 1 > δ > 0.
4.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium
4.3.1 Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
The four assumptions and three sufficient conditions for the existence of Cournot equilib-
rium addressed in Chapter 2 also apply to the nonlinear demand model. Each of the three
sufficient conditions will be shown in this section. Due to the complexity of the nonlinear
demand model, existence of Cournot equilibrium is not explicitly stated but is determined
computationally. The values used for the parameters of the computations are specified in
Chapter 5 and listed in Appendix D.
4.3.1.1 Intersection of Players’ Reaction Functions
The first sufficient condition to be presented for the existence of Cournot equilibrium is
the intersection of the three players’ reaction functions. The intersection of the manufacturer’s
implicit reaction function in (4.5) and the retailers’ reaction functions in (4.7) was found
through computational efforts. The equilibrium wholesale price and retail margins that resulted
were then used to compute equilibrium quantities and profits. The intersection of the three
reaction functions when α1 = α2 = α, β1 = β2 = β, and δ1 = δ2 = δ is shown in (4.8).
33
4.3.1.2 Players’ Assumptions are True
Again, this condition follows that of Chapter 2. For Cournot equilibrium to exist, the
assumptions each firm has about another firm’s actions must be the actual behavior. This is
described symbolically as w¯ = w∗, m¯1 = m1∗, and m¯2 = m2∗.
4.3.1.3 Second Order Sufficient Condition
The second order sufficient condition (SOSC) is the remaining sufficient condition to es-
tablish existence of Cournot equilibrium. When each profit function is concave at equilibrium,
the SOSC is satisfied. The condition is represented mathematically as
∂2ΠM
∂w2
< 0,
∂2ΠR1
∂m21
< 0,
∂2ΠR2
∂m22
< 0. (4.11)
This becomes
∂2ΠM
∂w2
= α1δ1(δ1 − 1)(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1−2
+ α2δ2(δ2 − 1)(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2−2
+ α1β1(β1 + 1)(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1−2(m¯2 + w)δ1
+ α2β2(β2 + 1)(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2−2(m¯1 + w)δ2
− 2α1β1δ1(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1
− 2α2β2δ2(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2−1
− 2α1β1(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1 + 2α1δ1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1(m¯1 + w)−β1
− 2α2β2(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2 + 2α2δ2(m¯1 + w)δ2−1(m¯2 + w)−β2 < 0,
∂2ΠR1
∂m21
= α1β1(m¯2 + w¯)δ1 [m1(β1 + 1)(m1 + w¯)−β1−2 − 2(m1 + w¯)−β1−1] < 0,
∂2ΠR2
∂m22
= α2β2(m¯1 + w¯)δ2 [m2(β2 + 1)(m2 + w¯)−β2−2 − 2(m2 + w¯)−β2−1] < 0. (4.12)
Due to the intricacy of (4.12), the SOSC for the manufacturer and two retailers was determined
computationally. Each example used for the sensitivity analysis in Chapter 5 and shown in
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Appendix D satisfies the SOSC.
4.3.2 Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium
Uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium will be shown using the contraction mapping argument.
If the implicit reaction function for the manufacturer in (4.5) and the retailers’ reaction func-
tions in (4.7) are contractions, then there is a unique Cournot equilibrium. The condition for
the retailers’ reaction functions to be contractions is∣∣∣∣∂m1(w¯, m¯2)∂w¯
∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∂m1(w¯, m¯2)∂m¯2
∣∣∣∣ < 1,∣∣∣∣∂m2(w¯, m¯1)∂w¯
∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∂m2(w¯, m¯1)∂m¯1
∣∣∣∣ < 1. (4.13)
This becomes ∣∣∣∣ 1β1 − 1
∣∣∣∣+ |0| < 1,∣∣∣∣ 1β2 − 1
∣∣∣∣+ |0| < 1. (4.14)
(4.14) shows the retailers’ reaction functions are contractions since β1 > 2 and β2 > 2.
If the manufacturer had an explicit reaction function, the following condition would be
sufficient to show that the manufacturer’s reaction function is a contraction∣∣∣∣∂w(m¯1, m¯2)∂m¯1
∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∂w(m¯1, m¯2)∂m¯2
∣∣∣∣ < 1. (4.15)
(4.15) is equivalent to ∣∣∣∣∣∣−
∂2ΠM
∂w∂m¯1
∂2ΠM
∂w2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣∣−
∂2ΠM
∂w∂m¯2
∂2ΠM
∂w2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 1. (4.16)
Since the manufacturer has an implicit reaction function, the implicit function theorem, as
described in Toumanoff & Nourzad (1994), is used to determine if the manufacturer’s reaction
function is a contraction. The condition in (4.16) is equivalent to the uniqueness of equilibrium
condition specified in Friedman (1977). For the nonlinear demand model, (4.16) becomes
| [α1β1δ1(c− w)(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1 − α1β1(β1 + 1)(c− w)(m¯1 + w)−β1−2(m¯2 + w)δ1
− α1β1(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1 − α2δ2(δ2 − 1)(c− w)(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2−2
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+ α2β2δ2(c− w)(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2−1 + α2δ2(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2−1]
/ [α1δ1(δ1 − 1)(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1−2 + α2δ2(δ2 − 1)(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2−2
+ α1β1(β1 + 1)(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1−2(m¯2 + w)δ1 + α2β2(β2 + 1)(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2−2(m¯1 + w)δ2
− 2α1β1δ1(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1 − 2α2β2δ2(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2−1
− 2α1β1(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1 + 2α1δ1(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1
− 2α2β2(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2 + 2α2δ2(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2−1] |
+
| [α1δ1(δ1 − 1)(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1−2 − α1β1δ1(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1
+ α1δ1(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1 − α2β2δ2(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2−1
+ α2β2(β2 + 1)(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2−2(m¯1 + w)δ2 − α2β2(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2 ]
/ [α1δ1(δ1 − 1)(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1−2 + α2δ2(δ2 − 1)(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2−2
+ α1β1(β1 + 1)(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1−2(m¯2 + w)δ1 + α2β2(β2 + 1)(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2−2(m¯1 + w)δ2
− 2α1β1δ1(w − c)(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1 − 2α2β2δ2(w − c)(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2−1
− 2α1β1(m¯1 + w)−β1−1(m¯2 + w)δ1 + 2α1δ1(m¯1 + w)−β1(m¯2 + w)δ1−1
− 2α2β2(m¯2 + w)−β2−1(m¯1 + w)δ2 + 2α2δ2(m¯2 + w)−β2(m¯1 + w)δ2−1] |< 1. (4.17)
When (4.14) and (4.17) hold, there is a unique equilibrium for the nonlinear demand model.
It was shown that (4.14) will always be true. However, due to the difficulty in simplifying (4.17),
numerical procedures were carried out to determine uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. Each
example used for the sensitivity analysis in Chapter 5 and shown in Appendix D is unique.
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CHAPTER 5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF NONLINEAR DEMAND
This chapter summarizes the results of the constant elasticity nonlinear demand model.
Sensitivity analysis was performed to determine the effects that four parameters had on equi-
librium margins, prices, quantities, and profits. The parameters, which include market po-
tential, price elasticity of demand, manufacturing variable cost, and cross price elasticity of
demand, lead the discussion for the analysis of the nonlinear demand model. Observations per-
taining to the sensitivity analysis will be conveyed, in addition to the economic and managerial
implications for the manufacturer, retailers, and consumers.
The fundamental parameter values are α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0,
c = 10, δ1 = .20, and δ2 = .20. β1 was varied from 3, which is near its lower limit, to 8, a
value that led to small profits. δ1 was varied between its upper and lower limits, 1 > δ1 > 0.
Additional parameters were allowed to differ by ±10%, ±20%, and ±50%, as seen in Arcelus
& Srinivasan (1989). Using these parameter values and equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) and
(4.7), the equilibrium quantities, profits, margins, and prices were found.
The examples used for the sensitivity analysis are shown in Appendix D. Each example
used in this analysis satisfies the sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of Cournot
equilibrium as conveyed in Chapter 4. Equilibrium decisions for the two-echelon model, total
channel profit, and RT , the ratio of the manufacturer’s profit to the total profit of the retailers,
will be discussed in the following sections.
5.1 Absolute Market Potential
The parameter for absolute market potential was varied while all other parameters were
held constant. The equilibrium solutions for margin, price, quantity, and profit are shown in
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Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 and lead the analysis. The conclusions made for retailer 1 would
be identical to the conclusions made for retailer 2, had absolute market potential for retailer 2
been altered and all other parameters held constant.
Figure 5.1 α1: α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that retail margins and retail prices are identical and independent
of market potential; refer to equation (4.7). For these reasons, consumers do not have a
preference as to the size of the market.
In Figure 5.3, there is a direct correlation between market potential and quantity demanded.
Retailers will be rewarded with large demand if they start out with a wide market. Further-
more, the retailer with larger market potential has a larger demand. Figure 5.3 also shows that
the market potential for retailer 1 has no influence over the quantity demanded for retailer 2.
Figure 5.4 shows that profits for the manufacturer and retailer 1 increase with market
potential. Using the cheese example from Chapter 1, when retailer 1 has a wide market for
cheese, retailer 1 will have large profits due to large customer demand. Additionally, the
manufacturer will earn large profits by producing a large quantity of cheese for retailer 1.
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Figure 5.2 α1: α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
Figure 5.3 α1: α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
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Figure 5.4 α1: α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
Figure 5.4 also shows that the retailer with larger market potential has a larger profit. Since
margin and quantity demanded were constant for retailer 2, profit is as well. Appendix D shows
that RT stays constant regardless of market potential. Additionally, total profit increases as
market potential increases.
The observations relating to quantity and profit follow the intuition regarding market po-
tential. It is expected that these values increase as market potential increases. However,
a constant price for all levels of market size does bring about a possible weakness with the
constant elasticity nonlinear demand model. Firms would most likely raise prices if market
potential increased. This way, more profit could be made. With the constant elasticity non-
linear demand model, as market potential increases, the manufacturer and retailer 1 benefit
from increasing profits due to increasing demand and not increasing prices.
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5.2 Price Elasticity of Demand
Price elasticity of demand is a measure of sensitivity or responsiveness relating quantity
demanded to price. Because of the constraint βi > 2, price elasticity of demand will always be
elastic. As βi increases, quantity demanded for retailer i becomes more and more sensitive to
changes in retailer i ’s price. The conclusions made for retailer 1 would be identical to those
made for retailer 2, had price elasticity of demand for retailer 2 been studied.
Figure 5.5 β1: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the margins and prices for the supply chain members. Retailer 1
has a decreasing margin and price as its elasticity increases. The manufacturer and retailer 2
have either a decreasing or increasing margin and price as price elasticity for retailer 1 increases.
The minimum margin and price for the manufacturer and retailer 2 occur at the same level of
price elasticity for retailer 1. The maximum margin and price for all players occur when price
elasticity for retailer 1 is lowest. The retailer with the lower value of price elasticity has the
higher margin and higher price.
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Figure 5.6 β1: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
Figure 5.7 β1: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
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Figure 5.8 β1: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
The maximum quantity demanded for each retailer occurs at different prices and at different
levels of price elasticity. Demand for retailer 1 is large when price is high and price elasticity
of demand is low. Using the cheese example from Chapter 1, if cheese has a low price elasticity
of demand, there will still be a large demand for it even though prices are high. Demand then
decreases with increasing price elasticity. Retailer 2 has its largest demand at its lowest price.
Since price elasticity of demand is elastic, quantity demanded will respond to changes
in price. This is exhibited by retailer 2 in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 and in Appendix D. When
price significantly decreases, quantity demanded significantly increases. When there is a small
increase in price, there is a small decrease in demand.
Figure 5.8 and Appendix D show that the retailer with lower price elasticity of demand has
a larger profit. Retailer 1 has its largest profit when price and quantity demanded are highest,
which occurs when its price elasticity is lowest. Retailer 2 has its largest profit when price
is at its lowest and quantity demanded is at its highest. This occurs when price elasticity of
demand for the retailers is nearly symmetric. RT decreases and then increases for increasing
levels of price elasticity.
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The profits for the manufacturer, retailer 1, and the total channel are largest when price
elasticity of demand for retailer 1 is lowest. RT is also highest when price elasticity of demand
for retailer 1 is lowest. These observations can be obtained using Appendix D. Retailer 2
prefers price elasticity of demand for retailer 1 to be slightly above its own price elasticity.
Retailer 2 has its largest profit when this occurs. Based on retail price, consumers will want
to buy the substitute product that has the higher price elasticity of demand. In addition, as
price elasticity of demand increases, consumer surplus increases.
5.3 Manufacturing Variable Cost
Manufacturing variable cost was varied to determine the effects it has on the equilibrium
solutions for margin, price, quantity, and profit. Figures 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12 display these
solutions.
Figure 5.9 c: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
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Figure 5.10 c: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
Figure 5.11 c: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
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Figure 5.12 c: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, δ1 = .20, δ2 = .20
As manufacturing variable cost increases, all margins and prices increase. With the in-
creasing manufacturing variable cost comes decreasing demand, as shown in Figure 5.11. The
decreasing demand has a greater effect than the increasing retail margins, resulting in decreas-
ing retail profits. The manufacturer also has decreasing profits when manufacturing variable
cost increases.
Retailers have identical margins, prices, quantity demanded, and profits regardless of the
manufacturing variable cost. This is confirmed by the equations in (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10).
Also, RT remains constant regardless of manufacturing variable cost. This is derived from
equation (4.10) and shown in Appendix D.
The entire oligopoly benefits from low manufacturing variable cost. Even though margins
and prices are low when manufacturing variable cost is low, profits are still high because
demand is large. Consumers benefit from low retail prices when manufacturing variable cost
is low.
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The results from this section reflect the impact of cost reduction. When a firm cuts costs,
it can gain a competitive advantage, which leads to large demand and substantial profit. For
example, if a manufacturer is able to reduce its manufacturing variable cost to produce cheese,
the manufacturer will be able to offer the cheese to retailers at a lower wholesale price. In
turn, retailers will be able to sell the cheese to customers at a lower retail price. The lower
retail prices lead to increasing customer demand. The increasing customer demand creates
large profits for the retailers and a large demand and large profit for the manufacturer.
5.4 Cross Price Elasticity of Demand
Cross price elasticity of demand is similar to price elasticity of demand in that it measures
the sensitivity of quantity demanded to price. However, cross price elasticity measures changes
across retailers. With substitutable products, increases/decreases in retailer i ’s price will cause
demand for retailer j to increase/decrease. The conclusions for retailer 2 would be identical to
those made for retailer 1, had cross price elasticity of demand for retailer 2 been explored.
Figure 5.13 δ1: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ2 = .20
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Figure 5.14 δ1: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ2 = .20
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 illustrate that margins and prices increase as cross price elasticity
of demand for retailer 1 increases. Retail margins and retail prices are identical regardless of
cross price elasticity of demand; refer to equation (4.7). Demand for retailer 1 increases and
demand for retailer 2 decreases as cross price elasticity of demand for retailer 1 increases. This
is demonstrated in Figure 5.15 and Appendix D.
A similar relationship can be seen in Figure 5.16. Profit for retailer 1 increases and profit
for retailer 2 decreases as cross price elasticity of demand for retailer 1 increases. As for the
manufacturer, profit increases with cross price elasticity of demand. Total channel profit is
large when cross price elasticity of demand for retailer 1 is high. Conversely, consumers prefer
products with a low cross price elasticity of demand because of the low retail prices.
The following example illustrates the effects of cross price elasticity of demand. Suppose
retailer 1 sells Brand A cheese and retailer 2 sells Brand B cheese. If Brand A cheese has a high
cross price elasticity of demand, increases in price for Brand B cheese will lead to increases
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Figure 5.15 δ1: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ2 = .20
Figure 5.16 δ1: α1 = 10000, α2 = 10000, β1 = 5.0, β2 = 5.0, c = 10, δ2 = .20
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in demand for Brand A cheese. Retailer 1 will then request that the manufacturer produce
a larger quantity of Brand A cheese. Because demand increases for the manufacturer and
for retailer 1, profits increase for the both of them as well. As for retailer 2, when the price
for Brand B cheese increases, demand for Brand B cheese decreases. Consequently, profit for
retailer 2 decreases.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
This paper extends the current literature by examining the margin, price, and quantity
decisions made by one manufacturer and two retailers under Cournot competition. The suffi-
cient conditions for existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium for linear and nonlinear
demand functions are shown. In addition, the effects of initial demand, price effect, manufac-
turing variable cost, and cross price effect for a linear demand model and market potential,
price elasticity of demand, manufacturing variable cost, and cross price elasticity of demand
for a nonlinear demand model are analyzed. Subsequent paragraphs summarize important
findings of this paper and outline future research opportunities.
Some parameters, such as price effect in the linear demand model, presented important
findings. The retailer with the lower price effect has a higher margin, price, quantity demanded,
and profit. Similarly, for the nonlinear demand model, it was found that the retailer with the
lower price elasticity of demand has a higher margin, price, quantity demanded, and profit.
So, retailers will benefit by selling products that have a low sensitivity to price.
The theoretical results of this paper pertaining to price sensitivity help a manufacturer
determine which product to produce and help retailers determine which product to sell. For
instance, suppose a manufacturer produces a brand of cheese with a high price effect or high
price elasticity of demand. As shown in this paper, the manufacturer would benefit by produc-
ing a different brand of cheese or a different product altogether if it had a lower price effect or
lower price elasticity of demand. Retailers, such as grocery stores, also benefit from the results
of this paper; retailers should sell a product that has a low price effect or low price elasticity
of demand.
Cross price effect in the linear demand model and cross price elasticity of demand in the
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nonlinear demand model are two additional parameters with important implications. Profits
are large for all members of the supply chain when cross price effect is high. In addition,
the retailer that sells the product with the higher cross price elasticity of demand will have
larger demand and larger profit. So, retailers will benefit by selling products that have a high
sensitivity to a competitor’s price.
Retailers can determine which products to sell using the theoretical results of this paper
regarding cross price sensitivity. For example, suppose a grocery store sells a brand of cheese
with a low cross price effect or low cross price elasticity of demand. The grocery store would
benefit if it sold a different brand of cheese or different product that had a higher cross price
effect or higher cross price elasticity of demand. In addition, the manufacturer should produce
a product with a high cross price effect or high cross price elasticity of demand.
Two parameters uncovered weaknesses with their respective demand functions. With linear
demand, it was found that equilibrium prices increase for the manufacturer and retailers as
products become more substitutable. This result contradicts intuition and may be due, as Choi
(1991) describes it, to the symmetric linear demand functions. As for nonlinear demand, all
equilibrium prices are constant as absolute market potential changes. This is a counterintuitive
result because price is expected to respond to changes in the size of the market.
Even though this paper enhances the current literature on game theory and the supply
chain, further research is warranted. One of the main assumptions of this paper was that the
manufacturer sells substitutable products to two retailers for the same wholesale price. An
additional model that could be studied is one in which the manufacturer sells substitutable
products to two retailers for a different wholesale price. This additional model would add to
the number of applications of the current model.
Furthermore, empirical studies could be conducted using the models of this paper to deter-
mine the types of products that have low price sensitivity and high cross price sensitivity. This
will help the manufacturer determine the products to produce and help the retailers determine
the products to sell.
Finally, this paper could be extended to include a general demand function. This paper,
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along with previous literature such as Lau & Lau (2003), demonstrate the importance of
utilizing the correct demand function; different results are achieved with different demand
functions. Thus, it is imperative that players understand the demand function faced by their
firm or industry. A model that included a general demand function would provide a benchmark
for firms in Cournot competition.
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APPENDIX A. Example: Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
The following example illustrates the three sufficient conditions for the existence of Cournot
equilibrium. The two players in this example include one profit maximizing manufacturer and
one profit maximizing retailer. The objective functions for the manufacturer and retailer are
max
w
ΠM = 16w + 12w3 − 4w4 − 4wm¯+ 12m¯− 48,
max
m
ΠR = 11m− m
2
5
− 4mw¯. (A.1)
The two reaction functions then become
w(m¯) =
(59− 8m¯+ 4√172− 59m¯+ 4m¯2)2/3 + 9 + 3(59− 8m¯+ 4√172− 59m¯+ 4m¯2)1/3
4(59− 8m¯+ 4√172− 59m¯+ 4m¯2)1/3 ,
m(w¯) = 27.5− 10w¯, (A.2)
and are shown in Figure A.1. Since the reaction functions intersect, the first condition for the
existence of Cournot equilibrium is satisfied. It turns out that the reaction functions intersect
twice. The next two conditions will determine if there are multiple equilibria for this game.
The second condition is that the assumptions each firm makes about another firm’s actions
must be confirmed as the actual behavior. Figure A.1 displays the reaction functions for the
manufacturer and retailer when they both have correct assumptions regarding each other’s
price or margin.
Finally, the second order sufficient condition for the manufacturer and retailer is
∂2ΠM
∂w2
= −24w(2w − 3) < 0,
∂2ΠR
∂m2
= −2
5
< 0. (A.3)
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Figure A.1 Multiple Equilibria
The manufacturer maximizes profit and has a concave profit function when w > 1.5. The
retailer has a concave profit function regardless of the retail margin. So, the three conditions
for the existence of Cournot equilibrium are satisfied for two different equilibria.
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APPENDIX B. Example: Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium
This section is the continuation of the example from Appendix A that illustrated a game
with multiple equilibria. Since the game has multiple equilibria, the condition for the unique-
ness of Cournot equilibrium fails and is demonstrated below.
In order to verify that a game has a unique Cournot equilibrium, it is sufficient to show that
the reaction function for each player is a contraction. Using the retailer’s reaction function,
(A.2) in Appendix A,
∣∣∣∣∂m(w¯)∂w¯
∣∣∣∣ = |−10| . (B.1)
Since |−10| ≥ 1, the retailer’s reaction function is not a contraction. The same conclusion can
be made from Figure B.1. When the contraction mapping approach is applied to the retailer’s
reaction function, there is diverging iterations. The game does not have a unique equilibrium,
and this confirms the result in Appendix A.
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Figure B.1 Diverging Iterations
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APPENDIX C. Examples: Linear Model
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